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Introduction
Contemporary problems of poverty and famine, the lack of access to clean water, 
wars and conflicts, poses an ethical question: how shall I/we respond to these challenges? 
What can be done to solve these problems? What are our moral obligations in the 
context of the severe circumstances that many people on Earth are facing? A possible 
answer to these questions, that is raising popularity, can be found in the philosophy and 
social movement called effective altruism [later EA]. Among the main originators of the 
movement and authors of the philosophical idea behind it are philosophers William 
MacAskill and Peter Singer. According to proponents of EA, there is a very clear answer to 
the above-mentioned issues and questions: we, as individuals, should do much more in 
order to solve these problems, and our moral obligations are very clear. We should search 
for the best way to influence the world for the better and to make the best usage of our 
resources, “impartially considered” (MacAskill 2019, 10).
We would like to propose some arguments against the effective altruism’s approach 
to the world’s problems.1 These arguments are going to concern practical examples of 
the negative impact of concentrating on effectiveness, the problem of the relationship 
between means and ends, as well as the influence of EA on thinking about political life. 
In other words, we will try to show that other answers to questions posed by EA are 
possible and viable. Questions such as: how to evaluate the effectiveness of our charitable 
1 However, it is worth noting at the very beginning that we do not want to repeat the arguments against 
moral obligations in general, or state that it is impossible to achieve the goals of effective altruists. These 
are also important moral issues, but we agree that moral philosophy needs to reach for ideals, which at 
first sight are impossible to achieve, or that common sense in ethical thinking is not always right and 
that improvements in that matter might rely on philosophical arguments (see McMahan 2012, 5–6). 
In other words, in this paper we will be taking many opinions for granted in order to concentrate our 
counterarguments against the most crucial issues in effective altruism.
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actions? What does it mean to achieve the most good in charitable actions? What is wrong 
with ignoring the broader context of your charitable actions? What does it mean that EA 
ignores the division between means and ends? Why should EA take into consideration 
ethics, economics and politics? 
In William MacAskill’s opinion, we should apply reason and evidence to our 
philanthropic activities. Our actions should have the greatest possible influence and 
translate into positive change in the world (MacAskill 2015, 18). In order to achieve these 
goals, we should follow effective altruism, which according to its proponents, is a solution 
to many ethical conflicts, and that economists and ethicists can finally meet and address 
our doubts. Therefore, in a way, we should cherish it as an end to the constant quarrels 
over values, virtues, and obligations. Finally, we could also obtain concrete answers to 
what we need to do in order to be good.
According to MacAskill, in order to understand effective altruism, we should take a 
look at altruism and effectiveness. He writes: 
altruism simply means improving the lives of others. Many people believe that 
altruism should denote sacrifice, but if you can do good while maintaining 
a comfortable life for yourself, that’s a bonus, and I’m very happy to call that 
altruism (MacAskill 2015, 18).
This is a visible change to the usual way of using the term, which includes in 
its meaning ‚disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being of others’ (Oxford 
Dictionaries). Making obsolete the tension between disinterested and selfless action on 
the one hand, and those which are realized in order to achieve our own goals and interests 
on the other hand, is one of the great innovations of effective altruists. This obsoleteness 
is often achieved by claiming that ethical behavior can be at the same time good for both 
us and others. By helping others we benefit ourselves. At the same time, this help does 
not need to involve much trouble or sacrificing our own interests (Singer 2015, 101–104). 
However, what if there is a conflict between what is most effective and most altruistic? 
The theoretical framework of an effective altruist may negatively influence our ability 
to recognize such situations. MacAskill writes that he understands effectiveness in the 
following way: 
doing the most good with whatever resources you have. Importantly, effective 
altruism is (...) about trying to make the most difference you can. Determining 
whether something is effective means recognizing that some ways of doing good 
are better than others (MacAskill 2015, 18–19).
The dictionary definition of ‘effective’ states that it means “successful in producing 
a desired or intended result” (Oxford Dictionaries). When we think of our altruistic 
behavior, our main concern and goal is to help another human being. While being effective, 
we are not concerned with other people and their dignity, but we strive for the best way to 
achieve something. These two different motivations may give rise to various conflicts of 
values. Such conflicts will be hard to recognize from the perspective of effective altruism, 
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which relies on diminishing the difference between the two.  
Peter Singer presents effective altruism as the best possible way for making our 
lives more moral in general (Singer 2015, 4–10). Applying effective altruism to ethics, 
in general, would mean making genuine differences between distinct ethical views less 
important, as those differences are an obstacle to being effective in being altruistic. 
However, the existing differences between ethical views are not a matter of empty 
scholasticism. Rather, they allow us to express the genuine differences between diverse 
world-views. This is hard to grasp after applying the perspective of effective altruism. 
1. The Results of a Practical Implementation of EA
In order to explain how EA neglects important aspects of moral commitments, we 
will refer to young professionals – Matt Wage (Singer 2015) and Jason Trigg (Matthews 
2013; Singer 2015, 45) who have followed the so-called ‘earning to give’ career model. 
The main idea of this approach is to consciously seek a high-earning career in order to 
donate to charity as much money as possible. The wage and Trigg examples show the 
most important flaws of EA advocated by Singer and MacAskill when it is realized. The 
above-mentioned professionals have been influenced by EA ideas and decided to start 
working for the financial sector to earn as much as possible in order to give a big part of 
it to support charities in doing the most good. 
Some of the concerns we would like to raise refer to threats to the moral integrity 
of people committed to ‚earning to give’, who might be deeply devoted to doing morally 
good deeds by earning the most money possible in order to spend it for a good cause, 
e.g. fighting malaria. There are three main areas of influence that might undermine such 
noble intentions. The first problem described below is selection effects, the second is the 
impact of studying the economy, and the final one concerns human resources management 
within the financial sector. 
Morality and world-views rarely remain unchanged throughout life, as one’s 
mindset evolves throughout life. When we enter adolescence, we create our view of 
morality. This is usually a result of shaping our moral values and understanding of the 
world. Choosing the subject we are going to study is an important part of this process. 
In an influential article written by Daniel Kahneman (1986b) and the following research 
(Frey et al. 1993; Cipriani et al. 2009; Rubinstein 2006), we can find a strong justification 
for the argument that there is a negative moral selection of economic students. People 
who choose to study economics are more selfish, less open for cooperation, and more 
prone to immoral behaviors than other students (Marwell & Ames 1981; Kahneman et al. 
1986a; Carter & Irons 1991; Frank et al. 1993; Selten & Ockenfels 1998; Frank & Schulze 
2000). Young people who, in most cases, are still in the process of their moral formation 
are exhibited to the influence of selfish, individualistic and self-centered peers. Even if 
their motivation for choosing a career in the financial sector is noble, they will be affected 
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by their colleagues.
The second problem is the construction of an economics curriculum. There is 
ongoing discussion about the way of teaching economy where one of the important aspects 
is the domination of the technical approach in understanding economics. Important moral 
outcomes of that process are indicated by researchers dealing with different fields of 
economics. Sumantra Ghoshal, a management researcher, suggests “that by propagating 
ideologically inspired amoral theories, business schools have actively freed their students 
from any sense of moral responsibility’” (Ghoshal 2005, 76). Researchers dealing with 
finance education point out that leading universities, which have a Master in Financial 
Engineering program, lack Business Ethics (10 out of 12) (Roncella & Roncella 2019). 
Another aspect of the problem is that even when universities have some kind of ethical 
course, the curriculum is focused on moral codes, rules, compliance and accountability. 
In order to enhance students’ moral development, one needs to create a learning 
environment that creates opportunities for taking responsibility (Schillinger 2006). We 
need more teaching focused on virtues and moral identity rather than rules if we want 
to foster students’ moral development (Neesham & Gu 2015; Roncella & Roncella 2019; 
Rochi 2019; Kucz 2019)
 People who follow the job advice from 80,000 hours website2 will not be aware of 
the risks described above, because they are out of EA concern. That is one of the important 
downsides of focusing on goals rather than processes, and neglecting the procedures 
leading to a certain end. We can see the analogous problem in the way we shall work 
(considered by the thinkers as the next step of implementing their idea).
Working for an organization striving to make the most money possible and trying 
to use all the possible means to earn more might have a negative impact on the financiers. 
In the long run, it is hard to imagine how working for a hedge fund would not have an 
influence on the way you see the world and your own place in it. It is quite possible that 
engagement in your work will diminish your motivation to maintain your support for a 
good cause which was initially your motivation.3 This is especially true when you work in 
a competitive, challenging and tough work environment. Most hiring managers as well as 
EA are focused on outcomes, not processes, and they are prone to overlook the difference 
between good leadership and unethical persuasion (Babiak & Hare 2006; Babiak et al. 
2010). An assessment based on profits and the short-term results of your work might be 
damaging for morally based motivations in the long run (Brooks 2013). What happens 
if in the long run this will lead to losing our moral intuition? How could we justify moral views if we will be concerned only with topics and aspects of the world which can be 
translated into the most effective ways of action? It is hard to answer these questions, 
2 This platform was started by MacAskill and provides individual guidelines for those who would 
like to commit themselves to the ‘earning to give’ career mode.
3 Singer is aware of this objection, although he fails to refute it. His main argument refers to the 
personal experience of the EA he knows (Singer 2015, 45–54). In this section, we refer to scientific 
research on that matter.
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but future events might change our view in the long-term influence of EA on our moral 
behavior.
We might conclude that Singer and MacAskill have created a theory worthy of 
attention as the exemplification of one of the possible models of reductionism in the 
sphere of values. This reductionism excludes certain spheres of human life from the realm 
of moral consideration by claiming that they have a rational and “scientific” character. 
Rationality is understood as effectiveness. Such an approach to this problem allows 
reductionists to present their theory as “an intellectual and practical project rather than 
a normative claim, in the same way that science is an intellectual and practical project 
rather than a body of any particular normative and empirical claims” (MacAskill 2017, 3). 
In their analysis, EA quietened the evaluative character of the assumption treating human 
beings as a “rational machine” making the most out of undertaken charitable actions.
In the case of efficiency understood in terms of neoclassical economy, we have 
to deal with an additional phenomenon. If we are thinking about different forms of 
charitable action according to their effectiveness and we consider such evaluation as 
free from moral values while subjecting it to the laws of the market efficiency, we end 
up with the marketization of this sphere. Moral values are replaced by economic values. 
This process can be called the commercialization of values – giving to some form of good, 
commonly associated with morality, a market value, usually interpreted as a price. It is the 
movement of a value from the sphere of dignitas – values that hold value because of their 
relationship to human dignity and cannot be exchanged, to the sphere of pretium – values 
that can be exchanged / sold, because they can be measured (Seneca, ep. 71,33).
Michael Sandel describes this process in his book ‚What Money Can’t Buy: The 
Moral Limits of Markets.’ He writes:
This a debate we didn’t have during the era of market triumphalism. As a result 
without quite realizing it, without ever deciding to do so, we drifted from having 
a market economy to being a market society. The difference is this: A market 
economy is a tool – a valuable and effective tool – for organizing productive 
activity. A market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every 
aspect of human endeavor. It’s a place where social relations are made over in the 
image of the market (Sandel 2009, 10).
To show how this was possible, he indicates that economists commonly believe in 
two tenets of faith in the market.
The first tenet is based on the belief that the introduction of financial incentives 
to any form of activities does not change it (Sandel 2009, 125). However, there is a lot of 
research in social psychology that concludes the opposite. In the case of the emergence of 
a financial incentive people do not think about what their duty is, but focus on what is the 
most profitable (Schwartz 2009). It turns out that the introduction of financial incentives 
(and penalties) displaces, crowds-out moral motivations rather than coincides with them 
(Titmuss et al. 1997; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini 2000). In the case 
of EA, it would mean that implementing it by ‚earning to give’ is impossible, because all in 
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all, we always end up only with the effective usage of resources, and altruism is crowded-
out by economical values.
The second dogma is based on the assumption that benevolent behavior and 
altruism are limited, and that it can be easily depleted (Sandel 2012, 126). EA would argue 
in this context that we need to be more effective in our altruistic acts. MacAskill claims 
that we need to make hard choices about the way we donate to noble cases and the way 
we spend our time on helping others. That is because, according to him, our resources 
are limited and the needs of those needing help are enormous “We need to prioritize” 
(MacAskill 2015, 34). In order to do this, we need to have a method of deciding whether 
some needs are more important than others.
MacAskill claims that even though income is not the only factor in deciding about 
our well-being, he writes that: “income certainly plays a critical role in how enjoyable, long 
and healthy your life is” (MacAskill 2015, 27). Therefore, the conclusion that benefiting 
others can be understood as raising their income and that proper analysis of the situation 
can provide us with information on how much money can benefit recipients of our help 
(MacAskill 2015, 27). The scale of our influence, the opportunity to change the lives of 
others for the better, the possibility of helping “thousands of people” (MacAskill 2015, 
30), and the fact that one hundred dollars in a poor country can make a much greater 
difference than the same amount of money in a rich country, are all reasons to take action 
and to decide who we should help. Avoiding such a decision would mean not doing the 
most we can do in order to help other people (MacAskill 2015, 30).
Matt Wage works for an arbitrage trading firm, and Jason Tigg works for high-
frequency trading firms. They both are analytical employees, so they might not have much 
influence on what their calculations, algorithms, and formulas are used for. Their role is 
not as simple as stating that they ‚write software that turns a lot of money into even more 
money’ (Matthews 2013). Neither of them can be absolutely sure that all they do is allow 
‘raising investment capital, reducing risk, and smoothing out swings in commodity prices’ 
(Singer 2015, 50). They might as well contribute to investments in financial instruments 
that are directly or indirectly involved in speculating on food prices, companies that make 
a profit by slave labor, very bad working conditions, or semi slave labor, depleting the 
planet’s natural resources, as well as, or other forms of generating profits by degrading 
human dignity and the natural environment. 
From the EA perspective, these negative effects of their activity are negligible, 
because it would have been difficult to provide a precise measure of their negative impact. 
It is worth noting that difficulties in calculating something does not make it disappear, 
and we should consider the negative effects of financial market activities in our ethical 
evaluations of decisions and actions. As EA is concentrated on the most good results, the 
good intentions of actors involved does not change much in the ethical evaluations of 
their actions. There is no easy way to assess the effects of global markets activity. Why 
should we be optimistic rather than pessimistic about the outcomes of financial markets 
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activity?
2. Means and Ends
 In the first part of our paper, we have described some of the issues related to 
searching for the best means. Before we move on to the problem of searching for ends, 
we would like to consider the differentiation between means and ends. According to the 
EA movement, we can use whatever method necessary in order to achieve the best result 
in helping others. In this way, means and ends are not distinguished, since the goal is 
obvious, namely doing the most good possible, and the means are identical with the best 
method in order to achieve the most good. 
However, from the point of view of many ethical theories, means are not ethically 
neutral and their ethical evaluation cannot be ignored thanks to their greatest impact, 
or justified by the most noble goal whose achievement they are meant to serve. This is a 
much deeper ethical problem than it may seem at first glance. MacAskill’s way of writing 
and describing the problems connected with altruism and charity implies that the trade-offs between different actions are either technical or depend on the lack of an effective 
attitude towards them. The first approach has been analyzed by him many times and he 
tries to show different methods of searching for the most effective way of achieving a 
goal. At the same time, he is unable to give a solution when we are talking about different 
ethical values, and thus, he seems to think that all that matters are technical questions:
Effective altruism, at its core, is about (…) trying our best to make hard trade-offs. 
Of all the ways in which we could make the world a better place, which will do the 
most good? Which problems should we tackle immediately, and which should we 
leave for another time? Valuing one action over another is difficult psychologically 
and practically, but it is not impossible. In order to make comparisons between 
actions, we need to ask: How many people benefit, and by how much? This is the 
first key question of effective altruism (MacAskill 2015, 34).
Ethical decisions involve not only deciding whether we have the best means to 
achieve a given goal, but also a reflection on whether a particular goal is noble, worthy or 
good. We need to know not only what the best action in a given circumstance is, but also 
where this action should lead us. We need to answer questions not only about what needs 
to be done, but also questions of where we are coming from and where we are heading. 
This blind spot leads MacAskill to ignore the problem of difference in ethical values, as if 
what we think about well-being, benefit and what the good life means, could have been 
taken for granted.
 According to effective altruism, cultural, ethical, political differences are something 
we can ignore or translate into technical differences, because everyone would agree, that 
they want to do the most good and to be the most effective at it. Maybe they would, but 
still we may have differences in opinions concerning the goal to which we should direct 
our most effective actions. By taking a goal for granted and concentrating only on the 
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best road to achieve it, we would ignore the difficulties in making decisions between 
goals. We would still be unable to make decisions, since even if we agree about the best 
way to achieve something, we might disagree about what we want to achieve (Ranciere 
1999, 123–125). This is vividly visible in a description of different focus areas of effective 
altruism, where we can read: 
Cooperation is crucial for growing the movement, so I hope that even if it’s not 
always easy, effective altruists will “go out of their way” to cooperate and work 
together, no matter which focus areas have their sympathies (Muehlhauser 2015, 
105–106).
We were supposed to achieve a method of rationally deciding about what to do 
in order to improve the world. However, in the case of differences between focus areas, 
which actually entail differences between the goals we want to achieve, there is no 
method of choosing between different goals. To that extent, the decision about including 
environmental issues on the list of focus areas of EA seems to depend on having a group 
of members of the EA movement who would concentrate their efforts on environmental 
issues (Muehlhauser 2015, 105). 
MacAskill tried to answer a similar objection by stating that: 
Effective altruism would then be about trying to find out and do those activities 
that do no less good than those with which they are commensurable. The 
project would however have relatively little scope if there were rampant 
incommensurability, e.g., between any two activities that benefit separate 
individuals. But such rampant incommensurability seems independently 
implausible (MacAskill & Pummer 2012, 6).
However, there exists a socially recognized way of deciding about different goals, 
searching for dialogue and understanding ways of making two values that are viewed 
impossible to compare, closer to each other. This way is called politics. Third part of our 
paper will consider some political arguments against effective altruism. 
3. Effective Altruism and Politics
 The third scope of the issues concerning effective altruism discussed in this 
paper will concern some of the political consequences of this point of view. Claims that 
our engagement in helping others should be evaluated according to its effectiveness in 
realizing goals which can be measured and optimized. In this way, this chapter will be 
a part of an ongoing discussion about systemic (see Snow 2015) and institutional (see 
Berkey 2017) aspects and the influence of the EA philosophy and movement. We will 
concentrate on the issues of politics as a process and public discussion as a dialogue about 
setting goals of communal action. Thus, our views are in some part similar to Snow’s 
critique, and we try indirectly to address some of the arguments provided by Berkey in 
the defense of EA. 
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For example, one of the main solutions to the problems of poverty lies in spending 
money in a better way (MacAskill 2015, 13–20). This rules out, for example, the systemic 
aspects of environmental hazards (see Welzer 2012) and violence (see Haugen & Boutros 
2014) as factors causing premature deaths and a lot of suffering, as well as their influence 
on poverty, since we can claim that our limited resources and means are hardly able to 
make a significant change in these areas. This skepticism is visible in both Peter Singer 
and MacAskill’s writings. While writing about the norm of self-interest Singer claims:
most of us are keen to fit in with everyone else, we tell stories about our acts 
of compassion that put a self-interested face on them. As a result, the norm of 
self-interest appears to be confirmed, and so the behavior continues. The norm 
is self-reinforcing and yet socially pernicious, because if we believe that no one 
else acts altruistically, we are less likely to do it ourselves; the norm becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy (Singer 2010, 77, 78).
However, a similar criticism could be made against EA itself. The main paradigm 
of evaluating our decisions remains concentrated on fulfilling interests. The only change 
that EA wants to achieve is to broaden the groups of beings, entities, groups, that we 
are going to include in our calculations. Even while considering political actions, Singer 
stresses how political interests are very hard to change and that: “our efforts are better 
spent elsewhere, where we can be confident of making a difference” (Singer 2010, 114). 
For Singer, the only aspect of our behavior, which we need to change, is the scope of 
our interest-oriented attitude. The interest-oriented way of thinking is not a problem. 
According to Singer, the best solution would be to apply technical tools of effectiveness to 
our individual charitable behaviors.
The issue with political discussion and political process is very visible in the 
simplifications of politics in the perspective of effective altruists. EA might answer that it 
is not the point, since the EA is about helping others and does not provide a theory to be 
applied in any decision-making process. However, in another text MacAskill answered the 
question of applying EA to political decisions:
You should start by asking yourself: How much do I personally expect to gain by 
having my preferred party in power? If your preferred party is the Republicans, 
then you might expect to benefit because you’ll pay fewer taxes. If your preferred 
party is the Democrats, you might expect to benefit because you’ll receive 
more government-funded public service. Suppose for the sake of argument you 
conclude that your preferred party getting into power is worth $1,000 to you. (...) 
The government also, of course, makes people better or worse off in other ways, 
such as through regulation (MacAskill 2015, 78).
In the quotation above that analyzes our relationship with the government, we do 
not see an altruist anymore. What we should consider first is our personal gain and not 
any other reason (also ethical reasons) to prefer one over another political party. We see 
here an old-style egoist whose main concern is what he/she can benefit from choosing 
this or that faction. Voting is understood by EA as something concerned mainly with 
personal gains.
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World poverty is not a natural disaster. It is connected with the way resources and 
power are divided, as well as how the social and political systems operate. The financial 
sector and international financial institutions do not always play a positive role in helping 
poor countries become richer and to be able to solve their problem with poverty on their 
own (see Chang 2008). By being a part of the financial sector, you are co-responsible for 
the very same problems you want to solve by your donations. You foster a world view 
of evaluating everything according to its financial value and to substitute value with its 
financial value. The extent of this co-responsibility is not that easy to pin, but it remains 
an ethical issue in deciding about your future career and about the ethical value of your 
actions (see Mazzucato 2018, 11–24). Maybe it is a bit of an overblown metaphor, but the 
EA movement might be compared to someone who would try to solve problems connected 
with traffic, car accidents and air pollution by working for a car producer and spending 
half of his salary on donations to organizations working against traffic and car accidents. 
The lack of moral framework and the concentration on efficiency and the general 
idea of well-being leads to justifying actions that are morally dubious. For example, 
MacAskill jumps to the conclusion that since sweatshops have a positive economic 
influence and that people who are living in poor countries are willing to work in them, we 
should agree with the economists who claim that sweatshops are good for poor countries 
(MacAskill 2015, 113–114). 
In the best case scenario, this is morally ambiguous and leads to justifying whatever 
economic means that can be used in order to make poor countries richer. However, these 
ways of getting richer are not morally neutral. It is also worth noting that we need to 
have tools in order to evaluate more and less moral ways of improving the economic 
situation of those countries. There are better and worse ways. Many of the ways proposed 
by economists working for international institutions are more concerned with the well-
being of rich countries financing those international institutions and not with resolving 
the economic problems of poor countries (see Chang 2008, 177–181). 
Using slave labor, exploiting children and contributing to the profits of mainly 
international companies, who are main beneficiaries of these kinds of practices, is wrong, 
even if you spend part of the money gained in this way on charity. All decisions related to 
helping poor countries need not only an economic perspective to be decided about, but 
also an ethical and political reflection and perspective. However, these two perspectives 
are downplayed by EA, as they would have made our actions less effective and slow them 
down. Providing these perspectives is a very important task for moral philosophers, not 
in order to discover the one and only way of evaluating all moral decisions, but rather to 
involve themselves in “the democratic and open-ended process that is needed to develop 
a common set of basic values in a society” (Hansson 2013, 126) 
 MacAskill used hyperbole to claim that if we do not have a common measure 
it means we cannot say whether something is better or worse (MacAskill 2015, 41). A 
universal viewpoint is possible here because MacAskill uses the cases concerning health 
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and very generally understood well-being. In our opinion, to conclude from these examples 
that we can rely on EA for providing tools for solving ethical conflicts, and claiming that 
we will be able to make comparisons and find the best solutions, is a huge simplification. 
Ethical conflicts are very often about the gray areas between different values and 
priorities, that cannot be solved by scientific quantitative methods (Elzenberg 1994, 
411–412). They also involve measures of what is good and what is evil, and the hierarchy 
of ethical values. We need frameworks and possibilities to discuss these differences in 
values (Mouffe 2000, 101–105).
 By denying the influence of relations with other people on his decisions about 
helping others, MacAskill claims to achieve fairness; however, in this way, he needs to say 
that fairness is more important than any other value, than our inner feelings, empathy, 
etc. (MacAskill 2015, 42). Of course, he can have such an opinion, but we do not think 
that we can reduce ethics to fairness. Why is this obligation to be fair applied to charity 
and the amount of money and time we decide to use to help others, and not to all the 
other relations and aspects of our life? Who or what decides on placing such a limit on 
the fairness principle? Is there a place for empathy? Can we really go so far as to say that 
helping others means saving lives and improving the lives of people of whom we should 
not have any personal opinion, with whom we should not have any personal connections, 
because this could diminish our ability to rationally decide about the most effective way 
to help? 
When responding to similar objections concerning lack of taking into consideration 
ethical restrictions and norms, MacAskill claimed that: “effective altruism is the project 
of using evidence and reason to try to find out how to do the most good, and on this basis 
trying to do the most good, without violating constraints” (Pummer & MacAskill 2019, 
5). This however, does not answer the main point of this argument, namely, what are 
those constraints, how to decide about them, whether being a part of a harmful economic 
system already is beyond these constraints? We think there might be a strong argument 
for such a case, especially in trading stocks of firms selling weapons or exploiting the 
weakness of institutions in poor states (Haugen & Boutros 2014). However, EA does not 
expect such problems to arise, since everyone should agree that we should do the most 
good possible. 
 Conclusion
 Effective altruism encourages us to check how much good we can using our mo-
ney. We understand the intention standing behind such a calculation and we respect it to 
some extent. However, we do not think that we can still call it altruism. On the one hand, 
effective altruism tries to build up the best moral framework; while, on the other, it leaves 
most of our actions out of the equation, since they are not something effective altruists 
are concerned with. The limits of the theory are built up in a such a way that it should be 
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helpful to justify it, but at the same time, it allows for arguing that everything else is not 
the part of the theory. The world seems not to work in such an analytical manner. Connec-
tions between ethics, the economy and politics do exist and philosophical reflection will 
not abstain from trying to describe them. Of course, attempts to provide them will some-
times end up with mistakes and will not always provide us with satisfactory answers. This 
does not mean that it is better to close your eyes and pretend that these connections do 
not exist and that you can solve the world’s problems without concerning yourself with 
the difficult gordian knots of relations between values, power and decision making. 
 EA tends to believe that focusing on efficiency leads to a situation in which empa-
thy and kindness are not a relevant issue, in which means can be evaluated in a technical 
manner and goals are unproblematic and common. What they appear to underestimate 
is that morality might be weakened by concentration on impersonal help only, without 
any association with the beneficiaries of our help. Even if they are right in making such 
claims about ethical values, they should also consider other ethical attitudes, other goals 
and other understandings of “the best we can do”. They have created an image of a mo-
ral theory that is scientifically and ideologically neutral, and they have missed the moral 
costs of the market mechanisms’ functioning within it. We have presented these costs in 
this paper, with three main aspects of them being the commercialization of values, limits 
on thinking about goals as given, as well as the political context in which EA helpers are 
acting. In other words, EA takes a shortcut in moral discussions and applies effectiveness 
as a common ground for ethical evaluation of charitable action. In our eyes that is a mista-
ke.  
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Abstract: This paper presents a critical evaluation of ethical and philosophical 
concerns about the effective altruism as an ethical position. Effective altruists 
claim that one of our important ethical obligations is to do the most good possible, 
with the biggest possible positive impact. This impact should be measured with 
rational tools and by evaluating the effectiveness of our actions. At first glance, this 
might seem as a consensus building position, a good starting point for building a 
community of people wanting to change the world for the better. In our paper, 
we present some difficulties which are connected with such a way of thinking 
about charity and an ethical obligation to donate. We discuss the problem of the 
commercialization of ethical values, understanding effectiveness, agreeing about 
goals, as well as the political consequences of effective altruism understood as an 
ethical position. 
Keywords: effective altruism; values; charity; philosophy of economy; means; 
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